

Investing in electricity production under a reliability options scheme

Fulvio Fontini, Tiziano Vargiolu, Dimitrios Zormpas

University of Padova

February 4th, 2019

- Should we stimulate investments in electricity production and if yes how?
- Energy-only markets (no intervention).
- Capacity Remuneration mechanisms (intervention).

CRMs and ROs (cont.)

- Reliability Options are about to be implemented in Italy.
- Contracts between the system operator and a power producer.
- The power plant receives ex-ante a flow of payments.
- In return, a price cap is imposed.

- Are ROs effective, i.e., able to foster investments?
- What is the impact on the investment value?

Methodology: The Real Options Approach

- According to the Real Options Approach, when contemplating an investment characterized by **uncertainty** and **irreversibility**, the **ability to delay** the investment is valuable.
- Investments in power production are characterized by uncertainty (e.g. volatile prices and production costs) and irreversibility (e.g. the mere construction of a power plant).

The basic set-up

- A potential investor is contemplating investing in a power plant.
- The investment cost associated with the project is $I > 0$.
- The market price is P_t and is assumed to be fluctuating over time according to the following gBM:

$$\frac{dP_t}{P_t} = \alpha dt + \sigma dW_t \text{ with } P_0 = P$$

- α is the drift, σ is the instantaneous volatility, P is the starting point of the process and W_t is a standard Wiener process.

The basic set-up (cont.)

- The production cost of electricity is assumed to be constant and equal to $c \geq 0$
- The instantaneous profit flow is $\pi_t = P_t - c$.
- Also i) risk-neutral potential investor, ii) $r > \alpha$, iii) once launched, the project runs forever.
- The problem that the potential investor needs to solve has to do with the choice of the **optimal investment timing**.

The investment problem in the absence of ROs

- The operating value of the power plant is:

$$V(P_t) = \frac{P_t}{r - \alpha} - \frac{c}{r}$$

- The potential investor has the option to invest in the power plant and get $V(P_t)$ by spending I .
- The value of the option to invest is:

$$F(P_t) = \max \left\{ V(P_t) - I, \frac{1}{1 + rdt} E_t [F(P_t + dP_t)] \right\}$$

The investment problem in the absence of ROs (cont.)

For $P < P_T$ we obtain:

$$P_T = \frac{\beta_1}{\beta_1 - 1} (r - \alpha) \left(\frac{c}{r} + I \right)$$

and consequently,

$$F(P_t) = \left(\frac{P_T}{r - \alpha} - \frac{c}{r} - I \right) \left(\frac{P}{P_T} \right)^{\beta_1}$$

where $\beta_{1,2} = \frac{1}{2} - \frac{\alpha}{\sigma^2} \pm \sqrt{\left(\frac{\alpha}{\sigma^2} - \frac{1}{2} \right)^2 + \frac{2r}{\sigma^2}}$ with $\beta_1 > 1$, $\beta_2 < 0$.

The investment problem in the presence of ROs

- The profit function is not $\pi_t = P_t - c$ anymore but:

$$\begin{aligned}\bar{\pi}_t &= \min \{P_t, K\} - (c - m) \\ &= \min \{P_t, K\} - n\end{aligned}$$

- $K (> 0)$ is the price cap that the RO poses.
- $m (> 0)$ is a fixed periodic payment.
- $n = c - m$

The investment problem in the presence of ROs (cont.)

The operating value of the project in this case is:

$$\bar{V}(P_t) = \begin{cases} AP_t^{\beta_1} + \frac{P_t}{r-\alpha} - \frac{n}{r} & \text{for } P_t \leq K \\ BP_t^{\beta_2} + \frac{K-n}{r} & \text{for } P_t > K \end{cases}$$

where

$$A = -\frac{r - \beta_2\alpha}{(r - \alpha)(\beta_1 - \beta_2)r} K^{1-\beta_1} < 0$$

$$B = -\frac{r - \beta_1\alpha}{(r - \alpha)(\beta_1 - \beta_2)r} K^{1-\beta_2} < 0$$

- $AP_t^{\beta_1}$ and $BP_t^{\beta_2}$ represent the obligation of the power plant to cash K when $P_t > K$, and P_t otherwise ($P_t \leq K$).

The investment problem in the presence of ROs (cont.)

The value of the option to invest is as before:

$$\bar{F}(P_t) = \max \left\{ \bar{V}(P_t) - I, \frac{1}{1 + rdt} E_t [\bar{F}(P_t + dP_t)] \right\}$$

The investment problem in the presence of ROs (cont.)

Since the investment threshold can be higher or lower than K , we consider two possible cases:

- 1 K is larger than, or at most equal to, the optimal investment threshold.
- 2 K is smaller than the optimal investment threshold.

Case 1 (the investment threshold is smaller than the price cap)

Provided that $K \geq \frac{\beta_1}{\beta_1 - 1} (r - \alpha) \left(\frac{n}{r} + I\right)$ we have:

$$P_T^* = \frac{\beta_1}{\beta_1 - 1} (r - \alpha) \left(\frac{n}{r} + I\right)$$
$$\bar{F}(P_t) = \left(AP_T^{*\beta_1} + \frac{P_T^*}{r - \alpha} - \frac{n}{r} - I \right) \left(\frac{P}{P_T^*} \right)^{\beta_1}$$

Case 1 (the investment threshold is smaller than the price cap) (cont.)

Note that:

- $P_T^* < P_T$
- Unsurprisingly $\frac{\partial P_T^*}{\partial m} < 0$, $\frac{\partial \bar{F}(P_t)}{\partial m} > 0$, $\frac{\partial \bar{F}(P_t)}{\partial K} > 0$.
- For a given m , we can obtain $\bar{F}(P_t) = F(P_t)$ by choosing

$$\hat{K} = \left(\frac{(\beta_1 - 1) \tilde{A} P_T^{*\beta_1}}{\left(\frac{n}{r} + 1\right) - \left(\frac{c}{r} + 1\right) \left(\frac{P_T^*}{P_T}\right)^{\beta_1}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\beta_1 - 1}} .$$

Case 2 (the investment threshold is larger than the price cap)

Provided that $K \in \left(lr + n, \frac{\beta_1}{\beta_1 - 1} (r - \alpha) \left(l + \frac{n}{r} \right) \right)$ we have:

$$P_T^{**} = \left[\frac{1}{B} \frac{\beta_1}{\beta_1 - \beta_2} \left(l - \frac{K - n}{r} \right) \right]^{\frac{1}{\beta_2}}$$
$$\bar{F}(P_t) = \left(BP_T^{**\beta_2} + \frac{K - n}{r} - l \right) \left(\frac{P}{P_T^{**}} \right)^{\beta_1}$$

Case 2 (the investment threshold is larger than the price cap) (cont.)

- P_T^{**} can be larger, smaller or exactly equal to P_T .
- For a given K , $\tilde{m} = c + rl - K + K \frac{r - \beta_1 \alpha}{(r - \alpha) \beta_1} \left(\frac{P_T}{K} \right)^{\beta_2}$ guarantees $P_T^{**} = P_T$.
- Also, $\frac{\partial P_T^{**}}{\partial K} < 0$, $\frac{\partial P_T^{**}}{\partial m} < 0$, $\frac{\partial \bar{F}(P_t)}{\partial m} > 0$, $\frac{\partial \bar{F}(P_t)}{\partial K} > 0$
- For a given K , a periodic flow \hat{m} such that
$$\left(I - \frac{K - (c - \hat{m})}{r} \right) \frac{\beta_2}{\beta_1 - \beta_2} = \left(\frac{c}{r} + I \right) \frac{1}{\beta_1 - 1} \left(\frac{P_T^{**}(\hat{m})}{P_T} \right)^{\beta_1},$$
 guarantees $F(P_t) = \bar{F}(P_t)$.

- The policy maker can use the ROs as investment stimuli.
- However, certain conditions need to hold for this to be the case.
- This depends on the constraints (budget, technical, political etc.) that the policy maker faces.

What's next?

- Can we stimulate investments while keeping a balanced budget?
- Relax the gBM assumption.
- Allow for a price cap that reflects the economic fundamentals of the energy sector, i.e., K stochastic or endogenous.
- Allow for mothballing when the price falls below the unit cost.