

# Determining the Demand Elasticity in a Wholesale Electricity Market

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**Open-**Minded

# **Table of contents**

- 1. Basic motivation
- 2. A Toy Example of an Electricity Market
- 3. Our idea
- 4. Our Approach
- 5. The Obtained Results
- 6. Non-linear Elasticity Coefficients of the Demand
- 7. Concluding Remarks

## **Basic motivation**

- ▶ The shift to wind and solar power is accelerating
  - sources of flexibility in power systems are needed
- Demand side management gains in importance
- Demand elasticity in the German electricity market is scarcely studied
  - the shape and composition of the actual demand curve remain unknown

#### **Basic Motivation**



Figure: An example of a classical fundamental model with an inelastic demand curve

#### **Basic Motivation**



Figure: A wholesale market equilibrium on 2017-01-01 00:00:00 CET (left) vs. its manipulated form with an inelastic demand curve as follows from [Coulon et al., 2014] (right)

## A Toy Exmaple of an Electricity Market



#### Our Idea: Find a Solution "in Between"



Figure: A wholesale market equilibrium on 2017-01-01 00:00:00 CET (left plot) vs. its manipulated form with an inelastic demand curve as follows from [Coulon et al., 2014] (right plot)

## **Our Approach**

- ► Take the wholesale supply and demand curves
- Conjecture the internal equilibrium price of the Utility
- Decompose the wholesale supply and demand curves into individual schedules of a Retailer, Supplier and Utility WM
- Reconstruct the initial supply and demand schedules of the Utility using those of the Utility WM
  - adjust one of the obtained curves to preserve the conjectured equilibrium price
- Incorporate the obtained supply and demand schedules into a fundamental model

## **Our Approach: Toy Example**



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# **Step 1: Defining the Wholesale Supply and Demand Curves**

► Let *W* denote the wholesale market and assume

WSup: 
$$\underbrace{(0,\infty)}_{\text{Volumes}} \mapsto [p_{\min}, p_{\max}]$$

WDem : $(0,\infty) \mapsto [p_{\min}, p_{\max}]$ 

► The respective inverse functions are thus

$$WSup^{-1} : [p_{\min}, p_{\max}] \mapsto (0, \infty)$$
$$WDem^{-1} : [p_{\min}, p_{\max}] \mapsto (0, \infty)$$

► The corresponding equilibrium reads

$$(\underbrace{v^W}_{\text{Volume}}, \underbrace{p^W}_{\text{Price}}) = \{v, \mathsf{WSup}(v) \mid \mathsf{WSup}(v) = \mathsf{WDem}(v), v > 0\}$$

# Step 2: Conjecturing the Internal Price of the Utility

► Suppose that the equilibrium price of the Utility is

$$p^U = a_0 + a_1 p^W$$

- the validity of the assumption can surely be criticized
- The volumes are thus split proportionally between a Retailer, Supplier and Utility

# Step 3: Decomposing the Wholesale Supply and Demand Curves

► Wholesale supply and demand schedules of a Supplier and a Retailer WSup<sub>0</sub><sup>-1</sup>(p) = 1<sub>[pmin,pU]</sub>WSup<sup>-1</sup>(p)

+ 
$$\mathbb{1}_{(p^U, p_{\max}]} \left( \mathsf{WSup}^{-1}(p^U) + (1 - \gamma_1) \left( \mathsf{WSup}^{-1}(p) - \mathsf{WSup}^{-1}(p^U) \right) \right)$$

 $\mathsf{WDem}_0^{-1}(p) = \mathbb{1}_{(p^U, p_{\max}]}\mathsf{WDem}^{-1}(p)$ 

$$+\mathbb{1}_{[p_{\min},p^U)}\left(\mathsf{WDem}^{-1}(p^U) + (1-\phi_1)\left(\mathsf{WDem}^{-1}(p) - \mathsf{WDem}^{-1}(p^U)\right)\right)$$

► Recall that wholesale and fundamental volumes of a Supplier and Retailer are equal, i.e. WSup<sub>0</sub><sup>-1</sup>(p) = FSup<sub>0</sub><sup>-1</sup>(p) and WDem<sub>0</sub><sup>-1</sup>(p) = FDem<sub>0</sub><sup>-1</sup>(p)

► The schedules of the Utility WS are

$$\mathsf{WSup}_1^{-1}(p) = \mathbbm{1}_{(p^U,p_{\max}]}\gamma_1\left(\mathsf{WSup}^{-1}(p) - \mathsf{WSup}^{-1}(p^U)\right)$$

$$\mathsf{WDem}_1^{-1}(p) = \mathbb{1}_{[p_{\min}, p^U)} \phi_1\left(\mathsf{WDem}^{-1}(p) - \mathsf{WDem}^{-1}(p^U)\right)$$

## Step 4: Supply and Demand Curves of the Utility FM



Figure: Converting the wholesale volumes of the Utility into the corresponding fundametal volumes (toy example)

## Step 4: Supply and Demand Curves of the Utility FM

The curves of the Utility WM are thus partially flipped to obtain the Utility FM, i.e.

$$\widetilde{\mathsf{FSup}^{-1}}_{1}(p) = \mathbb{1}_{[p_{\min}, p^{U})} \alpha_{1} \left( \mathsf{WDem}_{1}^{-1}(p_{\min}) - \mathsf{WDem}_{1}^{-1}(p) \right) \\ + \mathbb{1}_{(p^{U}, p_{\max}]} \left( \alpha_{1} \mathsf{WDem}_{1}^{-1}(p_{\min}) + (1 - \beta_{1}) \mathsf{WSup}_{1}^{-1}(p) \right) \\ \widetilde{\mathsf{FDem}^{-1}}_{1}(p) = \mathbb{1}_{(p^{U}, p_{\max}]} \beta_{1} \left( \mathsf{WSup}_{1}^{-1}(p_{\max}) - \mathsf{WSup}_{1}^{-1}(p) \right)$$

$$+ \mathbb{1}_{\left[p_{\min}, p^{U}\right)} \left(\beta_{1} \mathsf{WSup}_{1}^{-1}(p_{\max}) + (1 - \alpha_{1}) \mathsf{WDem}_{1}^{-1}(p)\right)$$

 Shifting one of these curves reconciles the prices of Utility WM and Utility FM

$$\begin{aligned} \mathsf{FSup}^{-1}{}_{1}(p) &= \mathbb{1}_{[p_{\min}, p^{U})} \alpha_{1} \left( \mathsf{WDem}_{1}^{-1}(p_{\min}) - \mathsf{WDem}_{1}^{-1}(p) \right) \\ &+ \mathbb{1}_{(p^{U}, p_{\max}]} \left( \alpha_{1} \mathsf{WDem}_{1}^{-1}(p_{\min}) + (1 - \beta_{1}) \mathsf{WSup}_{1}^{-1}(p) \right) - \min(\tau_{1}, 0) \end{aligned}$$
$$\begin{aligned} \mathsf{FDem}^{-1}{}_{1}(p) &= \mathbb{1}_{(p^{U}, p_{\max}]} \beta_{1} \left( \mathsf{WSup}_{1}^{-1}(p_{\max}) - \mathsf{WSup}_{1}^{-1}(p) \right) \\ &+ \mathbb{1}_{[p_{\min}, p^{U})} \left( \beta_{1} \mathsf{WSup}_{1}^{-1}(p_{\max}) + (1 - \alpha_{1}) \mathsf{WDem}_{1}^{-1}(p) \right) + \max(\tau_{1}, 0) \end{aligned}$$

# Step 5: Deriving the Fundamental Model

 Combining the supply and demand scheules of the market participants yields

$$FDem^{-1} = FDem_0^{-1} + FDem_1^{-1}$$

$$\mathsf{FSup}^{-1} = \mathsf{FSup}_0^{-1} + \mathsf{FSup}_1^{-1}$$

Market clears at

$$(v^F, p^F) = \{(v, \mathsf{FSup}(v) | \mathsf{FSup}(v) = \mathsf{FDem}(v)), v > 0\}$$

- with  $v^F > v^W$  and  $p^F = p^W$ 

## Parameter Estimation

- Volumes in the wholesale market are not equal to the electricity load since they do not
  - incorporate volumes from other markets (OTC, intraday, EXAA, etc.)
  - include import and export capacities
- $\triangleright$   $v^F$  should be linearly dependent on the load values
- The optimization function can thus be defined as

$$\underset{\boldsymbol{\varsigma},\boldsymbol{\theta}}{\arg\min} Q(\boldsymbol{\varsigma},\boldsymbol{\theta}) \quad \text{ where } \quad Q(\boldsymbol{\varsigma},\boldsymbol{\theta}) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} (load_i - \varsigma_0 - \varsigma_1 v^F(\boldsymbol{\theta}))^2$$

- where
  - $\bullet \quad \boldsymbol{\theta} = (a_0, a_1, \gamma_1, \phi_1, \alpha_1, \beta_1)$
  - ▶ *a*<sup>0</sup> and *a*<sup>1</sup> are the slope and intercept in the price equation of the Utility
  - $\gamma_1$  and  $\phi_1$  are the volumes of the Utility WM from the wholesale supply and demand curves, respectively
  - α<sub>1</sub> and β<sub>1</sub> are proportions in which upper and lower parts, respectively, of the Utility WM curves are flipped

# The Obtained Results

- ▶ The model was applied to the EPEX market and the year 2017
- ► The obtained coefficients are

$a_0$	$a_1$	$\gamma_1$	$\phi_1$	$\alpha_1$	$\beta_1$
5.890***	$0.963^{***}$	0.510***	0.984***	$0.287^{***}$	$0.019^{***}$

- significance levels are \*=5%, \*\*=1%, \*\*\*=0.1%
- the obtained values show that:
  - $a_0, a_1$ : the price  $p^U$  is almost equal to the prices  $p^W$  and  $p^F$
  - >  $\gamma_1$ : the wholesale supply curve is almost equally split between the Supplier and the Utility
  - $\phi_1$ : the Utility accumulates almost all purchase orders it can get
  - $\alpha_1$ : the upper parts of the Utility FM curves are rather elastic
  - $\beta_1$ : the lower part of the demand curve of the Utility FM is almost perfectly inelastic

## Fundamental Model on 2017-06-11 at 02:00:00



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## **The Obtained Equilibrium Volumes**



Figure: Fundamental Model volumes and the values suggested by the model in [Coulon et al., 2014] vs. actual load values and the Wholesale Market values for a two weeks sample from 08 June 2017 to 21 June 2017

## **Non-linear Demand Elasticity Coefficients**

- Remember that our demand curve is non-linear by assumption
  - Elasticities are thus computed through the formula

$$E_{F,i}^p = \frac{p}{\mathsf{FDem}^{-1}(p)} \cdot ls(p,h).$$

where

$$ls(p,h) = \frac{\mathsf{FDem}\left(\mathsf{FDem}^{-1}(p) + h\right) - \mathsf{FDem}\left(\mathsf{FDem}^{-1}(p) - h\right)}{2h}$$

▶ The coefficients were calculated for  $p^F \in \{0, 20, 40, 60, 80\}$  with h = 100 MW

## **Non-linear Demand Elasticity Coefficients**



Hour of the Day

Figure: Point elasticities of demand  $E_{F,i}^p$  at the point  $p^F$ 

#### **Concluding Remarks**

- ► The obtianed model allows us to
  - derive the fundamental market structure from the wholesale market data
  - approximate electricity load data well
  - determine a more precise form of the demand curve
  - compute non-linear elasticities of demand



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